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"Beautiful" Japan and its Future Security Policy
An Early Observation of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's Plan
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Abstract
Since 1945, Japan has been castrated of its politico-military power and paralyzed by dog-
mas. However, posトCold War Japan is proceeding to a still unclear transformation of its
National Defense. The purpose of this survey is to observe the mutation of Japan's security
policy in the early 21st century, highlighted by the vision of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo that
illustrates the views of the ruling elite. The analysis is underpinned by Abe's manifesto:
Toward a Beautiful Nation. Based on the study of these policies and their achievements, the
survey concludes that, in spite of some successes, this pattern of transformation is perhaps
not fully relevant and could be dangerous for Japan's interests and Asia's security.
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A Visionary Leader for the 21st Century s Japan?
第12巻第1号
Post-war Japan is tortured by a crisis of its security policy. For decades the crisis was
masked by freezing the doctrine behind comfortable but irresponsible taboos. However,
since the end of the Cold War, Japan started to awake and to question and debate these
taboos. Even if there has not yet been a big transformation, National Defense is already no
more the same. Following the 1992 PKO Law, small reforms are accumulating and simulta-
neously Japan is increasingly taking a more active role in security affairs. Nevertheless, in
spite of these steps, the final shape is still very uncertain because Japan is lacking a real
roadmap and vision.
For the moment, the transformation is marching slowly, but it seems to advance blindly
and could lead Japan in the wrong direction. In 2006, the man who was presented and pre-
sented himself as the visionary who would end the posトwar regime was elected at the
supreme office of Prime Minister: Abe Shinzo. Could it be that Japan had finally found its
leader toward a new age?
Abe Shinzo grew in a cradle of power that offered him the keys to rule Japan, and he had
in fact very few political experiences before being rapidly propelled to the top. His fame is
mainly based on his genealogy, on firm nationalist statements, and on his strong stance that
he took against North Korea. But, who really is Abe Shinzo?
Abe Shinzo, born September 21, 1954, in Nagato, is the crown prince of a mighty house-
hold from the Japanese political caste. His roots are from a samurai and landlord family at
the service of the Chosh屯Domain that was one of the leading powers for the Meiji
Restoration. His paternal grandfather, Abe Kan, was a popular member of the House of
Representatives who received the nickname of New Shoin or Showa Shoin as an ideological
heir of Yoshida Shorn, a nationalist martyr and leader from Chosh屯during the early
Bakumatsu periodl'. His maternal grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, was a high ranking civil
servant for the industrial development of Manchukuo,也e Japanese puppet state, during the
1930 s, and rose to the office of Minister of Commerce and Industry under the T句o Cabinet
and until the surrender of Japan. After being imprisoned as a Class A War Criminal by the
victorious allied powers, he was released in 1948 and returned to public affairs from 1952.
Only five years later, he was elected Prime Minister. The granduncle of Abe Shinzo, Sato
Eisaku, was a pre-war bureaucrat in the Ministry of Railways, elected to the Diet in 1949,
1 ) Literally "End of the Tent Government , which are the 一ast years of the Shogunate between the end of the poliey of seclusion in 1854
and the reestablishment of the imperial regime in 1868.
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promoted to Chief Cabinet Secretary of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, named Minister of
Construction in 1952 and Minister of Finance during the successive Kishi and Ikeda cabi-
nets, and finally prime minister three times between 1964 and 1972. The father of Abe
Shinzo, Abe Shintaro, led a mighty conservative LDP faction called the Seiwa Seisaku
Kenkyukai, became General Secretary of the LDP, and held various Cabinet offices too:
Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Minister of International Trade and
Industry, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Among the mighty members of that family, Prime
Minister Yoshida Shigeru, founder of post-war Japan, and grandfather of Aso Taro, Minister
of Foreign Affairs and cousin of Abe Shinzo, should also be mentionned.
In 1977, Abe graduated in political science at the Seikei University, and studied after-
wards at the University of Southern California. However, he never finished his studies in
the USA and returned to Japan in 1979 to work as en executive at Kobe Steel Ltd. In 1982,
he left the private sector to pursue bureaucratic posts as executive assistant to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs who was his father, as well as private secretary of the Chairman of the
LDP General Council and, from 1987, of the LDP Secretary General. Abe Shinzo really
started his political career in 1993 when he was elected to the House of Representatives by
his native Yamaguchi Prefecture. After that, he was successively elected five times by his
district of the prefecture. His first post in the Cabinet was as Deputy Chief Cabinet
Secretary of Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro in 2000 and of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro
in 2001. The next step was in 2005 when he was promoted to Chief Cabinet Secretary and
Minister of State. In parallel, he continued his ascension within the LDP and rose in 2003
to the second rank: the function of Secretary General of the LDP. Finally, on September 26,
2006, he was elected Prime Minister by the Diet. Only six years after his first post of
Cabinet member, and without having experienced the responsibility of minister, except as
Minister of State for a short year, Abe Shinzo was already crowned with the supreme exec-
utive power and was the new master of Japan. Before 2006, there was only the rhetoric of
his ideology to define him in national and international politics, and he started his Cabinet
with a mysterious and immaculate image. The golden prince of Japan s ruling elite must
now prove that he is a skilled and visionary leader, and this task is hard.
First of all, Abe describe himself as a fighting politician who speaks for Japan, stands
for the nation and the people, and does not fear criticism21. He also claims that he has the
same foresight and determination as Winston Churchill who was the first to smoke out the
2 ) ABE Shin埼Utsukushii Kuni he (Toward a Beautiful Nation), Bungeishunj晩2006, p.4-5
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threat of Nazi Germany and who, even when Britain was alone at war, never gave up and
led the allied powers to victory31. Politically, his ideology is liberal but in an open conser-
vative spirit41. He is very proud to declare himself a liberal. Finally, Abe Shinzo claims to
have a kind of holy mission with the objective of forging a great nation, an ideal Japan that
he has envisaged. His duty is a familial legacy and he had this consciousness since his
childhood. In 1959-60, his maternal grandfather, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, reworked
the US-Japan security cooperation in spite of violent opposition and demonstrations, to
make the partnership more equal and more respectful to Japan s sovereignty. Kishi knew
that the country was not able to defend itself and still needed the USA for its security, but
also that the first treaty of 1951 compelled its official sovereignty. For Japan to be reborn
from the ashes of defeat and war as a real independent nation, that treaty had to be
changed. Then, until the achievement of the new 1960 treaty, Kishi did not yield to the
massive anti-treaty movement that shook Japan and was driven by anti-conservative forces.
Only after the ratification of the treaty by the Diet, he resigned from his Prime Ministerial
office and ended his public political career, a sacrifice to the manipulated people's anger.
Abe Shinzo also believes that his granduncle and his father died because they sacrified their
health to their national duty, and that he must also dedicate his life to Japan and to achieve
the buildup of an ideal Japan started by his ancestors.
Roadmap towards National Transformation
The vision of Abe Shinzo is summarized into his book -Utsukushii Kuni he- that was
published shortly before the 2006 national election as a manifesto.
In the first chapter -Watashi no Genten (My Origins), he describes his political and
familial background, his upbringing as a great leader at the service of Japan. The second
chapter -Jiritsusuru Kokka (independent Nation) - firmly argues that Japan should show to
the world that it is a strong and independent nation that is able to protect its interests and
citizens, and that is proud of its identity and does not fear its past. The third chapter
-Nachonarisumu to ha Nani ka (What about Nationalism?) - is a direct continuation of the
second one and trie白 to define Japanese nationalism, and argues that there is no shame to be
nationalist. Furthermore, he says that there exists a positive nationalism to build, strength-
en, and care of the country and its institutions. Abe would like to promote the nationalism
3 ) ibid, p.40-41
4 ) ibid,p.18
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in a positive spirit to give a new impulse to Japan s pride and might. The second and third
chapters represent the first pillar of his vision: to be a proud and responsible major power.
The fourth chapter -Nichibei Domei no Kozu (Composition of the Japan-US Alliance) - is
his second pillar: to review the US-Japan security cooperation with the objective to con-
elude a third treaty that would strengthen and equalize the alliance. The fifth chapter
-Nihon to Ajia soshite Chogoku (Japan and Asia, then China)- defines a third pillar: the
Asian policy. This pillar is closely linked to the first and second ones. Abe would like to
emphasize the Asian role and identity of Japan. On the one hand, Japan should develop and
maintain friendly as well as peaceful relations with China. On the other hand, Japan should
be the leader and the center of a new Asian order or community, and should build up spe-
cial partnerships with India and Australia. The last pillar of his program, domestic harmo-
ny, is divided between the sixth chapter -Shoshi Kokka no Mirai (Future of a Small Birth
Rate Nation)- and the seventh chapter -Kyoiku no Saisei (Renewal of Education). Abe
plans to deal with the problems of small birth rate and demographic decrease by creating a
Japanese model of Providence-State in which there would be strictly controlled social
insurance, and in which the citizens, the local communities or authorities, and the compa-
nies, would have to become responsible for their own welfare and take initiatives under the
supervision of the national government51. That concept is named chiisai seifu to jiritsushita
kokumin6) (Small Government and Independent Citizens). In addition, Abe would like to
launch a new social policy to encourage an increased birthrate. That policy would be based
on a balance between job and private life, governmental sponsorship to the matrimonial
agencies to help the people to found couples, and renewing the positive image of the fami-
ly. His labor policy would complete the social policy to counter the estimate of future
demographic decline: more women and aged persons at work, increasing the level of tech-
nology used within the society and the economy, and attracting foreign workers especially
from Asia. The third major focus of Abe s domestic policy is education. He wishes to build
new generations proud of their national identity, to reform the school books to give them
more content, to add school programs especially in Japanese language and sciences, to
make a national evaluation for targeting the schools most in need of assistance and the nee-
essary reforms of the educational system, and finally to establish civic activities for the stu-
dents contributing to the society. In conclusion, Abe s vision for the new Japan seems to be
based on four pillars: namely, Japan as a normal major power; equalized and strengthened
5 ) ibid, p.164-170
6) ibid,p.170
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alliance with the USA; an Asian policy articulated between a peaceful relationship with
China and a new regional order centered on Japan; and a wealthy and harmonious Japanese
society.
Forging New Principles for Security Policy
We can define four principles for the future security policy envisioned by Japan s ruling
conservatives and their spokesman, the Prime Minister. These principles cross-cut the pil-
lars concluded from Utsukushii Kuni he, but will probably survive to the Abe Cabinet.
First Principle
Japan must protect its national interests: it is the real meaning of a sovereign nation. Abe
said: "…Starting with the representatives of companies, there are many active Japanese cit-
1zens overseas. In order to protect the overseas economic activities of the Japanese people it
is necessary to show to the criminals and the terrorists that if they touch the (Japanese)
citizens, Japan will not remain silent…" 7'・ Abe also refers to the case of也e USA during
the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, when they dispatched special operations forces and
other elite troops to protect and evacuate their citizens who became hostages, and when
they imposed economical sanctions on Iran. He advocates that Japan should do the same
actions in similar crises. Then, Abe shows that he is the man with the spirit and the forti-
tude to lead such actions for Japan when it is necessary: "-On July 5山, 2006, North Korea
launched missiles one after another. In reality, our government (Japan) predicted this inci-
dent well before that it happened. This is why I think that the government reacted with
promptitude. For example, starting with Ambassador Schieffer, we cooperated together
with the USA to decide the response and arrangements. Among other actions, early that
morning, Ambassador Schieffer visited the Prime Minister s Official Residence, and met
with the Director of the Defense Agency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and myself. The
strength of the US-Japan intelligence s exchanges and cooperation, and of the US-Japan
Alliance, were demonstrated domestically (Japan) and overseas, and especially to North
Korea. Moreover, my response group secretly contributed to the collection and analysis of
data, and to the counter-measures. This cooperation went through the offices of the Prime
Minister's Official Residence, and the matters under examination were numerous. ,The
7 ) ibid, p.52-53
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agenda consisted not only the efficiency of the response to multiple missile firings, their
possible ranges and targets, and the sanctions, but also the methods to inform the citizens,
the recommendations to the Security Council and the Cabinet, and, among others, the views
from inside North Korea. Of course, the problem of the abductions was also examined... 8)
Abe has based a large part of his reputation on his firm stand to reveal and resolve the
affairs of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea, and on his vigilant watch over the
Korean Peninsula crisis. He models his public image as a fighting and foreseeing national
leader, and his actions during the missiles crisis of 2006, when he was Minister of State and
Chief Cabinet Secretary, speak for themselves. But, he is enclosed by the current constitu-
tional framework that limits his efficiency as a leader. To really be able to protect Japan and
its national interests, even overseas, he needs to review the Constitution for allowing Japan
to act as a responsible and independent power. It is his major argument.
He wrote about what he calls the senryoku naki guntai no mujun (contradiction of the
armed forces without military force) that: "... at that time (when the Constitution was
made under allied occupation) , it was said that the Government Section making the draft
(of the Constitution) had on the one hand the restrictions of the Article 9 0f the
Constitution, and on the other hand came to the point of lacking the fundamental condition
of being a sovereign State…サ, and "…In 1954, when the Self-Defense Forces replaced the
Safety Force, the government demonstrated the view that in the case of dealing with an
armed attack against the homeland to use force as a means to defend the territory would not
violate the Constitution, and moreover concerning the military force that is forbidden by
Paragraph 2, Article 9 of the Constitution, the self-defense capacities under the necessary
minimal limit for self-defense are not a military force. As a result, the Self-Defense Forces
are not unconstitutional...101 '. On the contrary, Abe demonstrates that Germany, also defeat-
ed at the end of World War II, "… at the same time recovered its sovereignty, founded its
national armed forces, and joined NATO in 1955…11)' A country cannot be sovereign with-
out maintaining its own military forces as one of the necessary pillars for the National
Defense. In 1945, Germany was also disarmed by the allied powers and had to rebuild its
economy devastated by the total war but, contrary to Japan, had a responsible behavior of
sovereignty concerning its security and reforged its own military power. To prepare the
return of sovereignty and the confidence of the people within the military, Konrad
-8 ) ibid, p.53-54
9) ibid,p.123
10) ibid, p.125
ll) ibid, p.126-127
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Adenauer, first post-war chancellor of Germany made a speech in 1952 in front of the
Bundestag121 : "ニBased on the tradition of a noble army, we admire all our soldiers who
fought on the land, the sea, or in the air. We trust that the honorable and great merit of the
German soldier is that during the past years he received every blame but still he stands and
will stand again. Moreover, I believe that we will resolve as our common duty the assimila-
tion of the German soldier s moral value with the democracy-13)". Abe also underlines the
words of Theodor Heuss, first post-war Federal President of Germany, who declared that
・..the duty of National Defense is the legitimate child of the democracy..."; and that in
II
Germany the conscript soldier is named a Citizen in Uniform14'. In the post-war regime,
Japan followed a different path, but Abe would like to input a strong and independent spirit
of National Defense into the new Japan, and in harmony with democracy, like Germany did
immediately in 1955.
Second Principle
This principle corresponds to the、 second pillar of Abe s vision for a strengthened and
equalized Japan-US Alliance. In his view, the USA is both the most necessary and ideologi-
cally-linked ally for Japan. By consequence, this alliance is the vital axis for Japan s secu-
rity strategy, and should inevitably be maintained and upgraded: "…the USA is necessary
as an ally because Japan cannot provide alone its security. Nowadays, this situation is not
changed...Considering the nuclear deterrence and the stability of Eastern Asia, the alliance
with the USA is essential, and if we count their influence, economical power, and mightiest
military power within the international community, this alliance is the best choice.
Moreover... Japan and the USA share the fundamental values of freedom and democracy,
human right, rule of the law, and free competition and market economy...15)"
However, the obstacles to the strengthening of the Alliance are one more time the consti-
tutional restrictions. The Article 9 0f the Constitution imposes that: "aspiring sincerely to
an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war
as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling interna-
tional disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligeren-
12) "Federal Diet" : parliament of Germany established by the Constitution of 1949.
13) ibid, p.127-128
14) ibid, p.128
15) ibid, p.129
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cy of the state will not be recognized. The interpretation of Article 9 is that in case of an
armed attack against Japan the right of individual self-defense would be used to repel the
aggression, but because Japan renounces to the right of belligerency, it will not fight over-
seas, even not in collective self-defense. Then, the Alliance is unequal because, as it is
declared in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between Japan and the USA, Article V, 1960,
the collective self-defense is applied only by USA at the benefits of Japan, but without reci-
procity: each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
provisions and processes. The deal made between posトwar Japan and the USA was not to
share the same risks and responsabilities within an symetric relationship, but to exchange
the maintain of American bases in Japan against a protectorate over the archipelago. As
mentions Abe, this inequality means that: ... for example, when a missile is launched by a
foreign power against Japan, to avert a second shot, or to intercept the missile, it is not the
Japanese but the American air fighters that would strike the launching bases... It is the
American young people that would spur their life to protect Japan… Why must the
American troops who risk their life, their family, and their nation be satisfied about this sit-
uation?! For this reason, relations of confidence must be built between the two countries.
The former Secretary of State Kissinger said that an alliance is not a paper but a sense of
solidarity- 16) "
In the plan of Abe, the strengthening of the Alliance: ... is related to strengthen the
bond of confidence and to build a more equal relationship- In 1956, Japan joined the
UNO, but within the Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations it is clearly specified
that a member of the UNO has also solely the right of collective self-defense… it is also
legitimate for Japan to retain the right of collective self-defense as a natural right...17'". It
supposes that a new and third treaty of security should be concluded on the ground of
mutual confidence, collective self-defense, and pro-active doctrine. Such a trusted, equal
and active Japan-US Alliance would be the successor and improved concept of the former
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and is often compared in Japan to the special relationship
between the USA and Britain, in that case with Japan in the role of the Asian Britain. This
achievement would be in the spirit of former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru whose Meiji
diplomat s ideal always believed in the greatness of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and
16) ibid, p.130-131
17) ibid, p.131-132
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dreamed of its post-war revival, but with the USA as the new dominating Anglo-Saxon and
maritime power.
Third Principle
China is a rising major power with a decisive influence over the security of Japan and the
stability of Asia. Simultaneously, it is also a weak giant due to increasingly domestic prob-
lems, such as the difficult supply in energy to sustain the economical growth, the socio-eco-
nomical gaps within the Chinese population, or the lack of democracy. But,血ese domestic
challenges of China affect also Japan: if China is unstable, the entire Asia risks being
unstable. Moreover, Abe insists particularly that because China is the factory of the world,
the wealth of Japan depends of the wealth of China. For these reasons, the third principle of
Abe is to recover the Sino-Japanese relations that were damaged especially during the
recent years.
Abe drew some guidelines for the achievement of that goal. His first guideline has for
purpose to resolve the bilateral disputes and reduce the potential crisis: "… this reciprocal
relationship is hurt by the political problems... Then, from now on, to stabilize the Sino-
Japanese relations it is necessary to establish as early as possible the rule of splitting politi-
cal and economical affairs between the two countries…18)" The other major problem being
the anti-Japanese feelings within the Chinese people, Abe thinks that it is absolutely neces-
sary to show how Japan has completely changed since 1945, and that it is now a democratic
and peaceful country welcoming positive relations with China. In response, the second
guideline of Abe s Chinese policy is: "… because we must deepen the understanding and
the sensibility about Japan… we should enlarge the number of Chinese students (in
Japan) … and we need to put more efforts to multiply the job opportunities for them in
Japan…19)'
Fourth Principle
Japan emerged as a modern nation in the second half of the 19th century, during an age
dominated by the Western World and when the declining Eastern World was overwhelmed.
To differentiate itself from the backward and colonized Asia of that time, Japan followed
the triumphing pattern of the westernization for its modernization, and became a lonely
hybrid defined as neither East nor West. That process excluded Japan from Asia.
18) ibid,p.152
19) ibid,p.155
``Beautiful Japan and its Future Security Policy217
Nowadays, the Eastern World is rising again, and there is an enthusiastic and proud feeling
to be Asian that is flourishing again; while this regional buildup attracts Japan, refreshes its
Asian identity, and affects the primal impact on its security and wealth. The fourth princi-
pie of Abe s grand strategy is to return Japan into Asia, as a regional pole: "... To become
a country opened to Asia, it is necessary for Japan to enter in the view of Southeast Asia,
(South) Korea, Southwest Asia, and also Taiwan as a region… the aim is that (Asian peo-
pie) will come to Japan and will desire to work and invest (in the country)-.We must
open the door to resound with this ideal and the national character of Japan, for (the Asian
people) wish to educate their children in Japan, and perhaps to become Japanese= 20)''and
"- in the case of the dialogue for the security of Asia- also to promote the dialogue about
the Asia-Pacific energy cooperation, why not to conceive a new Asia-Pacific dialogue
between the ASEAN, Russia, India, China, (South) Korea, the USA, and Japan...21)''
The development of the Asian region and the Asianization of Japan clearly means for
Abe to merge Japan as the center of the Eastern World: "… it is necessary that Japan exeト
cise the leadership-22)"
In this Asia centered on Japan, India is expected to become a special partner: "… India is
particularly noticed as a new partner in Asia… the population is more than one billion of
people- In India, there are numerous industriously brilliant people, and it is one of the
most advanced nations in Asia in the IT field. The strengthening of the relations with India
is important to flourish the interests of Japan...23'. This task is another familial legacy to
Abe, since Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke visited India in 1959 with the expectation to
impulse such a special relationship, was warmly welcomed over there because India consid-
ered pre-war Japan as a model of Asian liberation against Western colonial powers, but that
after the resignation of Kishi as a Prime Minister the following year, the project was aban-
doned: "… Once, when my grandfather Kishi Nobusuke visited India, Prime Minister
Nehru addressed toward a crowd welcoming the future India… (and said) until now it
(Japan) cannot be compared to the suzerain power of Britain, but it was Japan that defeaト
ed Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. Me too, I made the resolution to sacrifice my
lifetime to the Independence of India. In India s public opinion surveys, the number one
friendly country is always Japan. However, (after the visit of Kishi Nobusuke) unfortu-
nately the exchanges with Japan were thin, and the economic relations were weak…24)"
20) ibid, p.157-158
21) ibid, p.160
22) ibid, p.160
23) ibid, p.158-159
24) ibid, p.159
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Abe plans to give a new start and to achieve this strategic cooperation, and even envisions
that India could become the first economic partner of Japan: "i‥But, ten years before, non
one did predict that the Sino-Japanese trade including Hong Kong will exceed the Japan-US
one, and it would not be absurd that ten years later the Indo-Japanese relations would
exceed the trade of Japan with China or the USA...25)"
Nevertheless, the special relations would not be limited to India, and Abe expects to
encourage and strengthen strategic partnerships also with the USA and Australia: ... The
(previously mentioned) pro-democratic power of India, and Australia that successfully
opened the Japan-USA-Australian strategic dialogue of 2006 at the Cabinet level, share
with Japan the universal values of freedom, democracy, fundamental human rights, and rule
of the law. It would be wonderful if we could conduct consultations from a strategic per-
spective, about the possibilities of cooperation, to open Japan-USA-India-Australia sum一
mits or ministers of foreign affairs level meetings and, especially in Asia, on how to con-
tribute for joining with other countries moved by such universal values...26)>:
Achievements of Abe s Security Policy
It is too early to fully estimate the final consequences of Abe s policies, but it appears
that he already has a lot of positive results during the first year of his cabinet: the upgrade
of Japan Defense Agency to a Ministry271, the project to modify the concept of civilian con-
trol by the assignment of uniformed Self-Defense Forces officers among the defense coun-
cilors , a draft to allow the Japanese troops dispatched in PKO to preemptively use their
weaponry to ensure their mission even if they are not directly under attack, another draft
for the exercise of the right of collective self-defense in stipulated situations within consti-
tutional limits291, the continuation of the reorganization of the Self-Defense Forces towards
a Flexible and Mobile Force Concept3ョas it was already started under the Koizumi Cabinet,
a Central Intelligence Unit will be established with joint and reinforced capacities311, the
realignment of the American troops that continues to be discussed and proceeded, the study
25 ibid
26) ibid,p.160
27) Defense Ministry Inaugurated, The Yomiuri Shinbun, January 10, 2007
28) Kyuma to Review Civilian Control, The Asahi Shinbun, January ll, 2007
29) Japan to Consider Fighting for Allies under Attack, De触seNews.com, April 7, 2007
(http:〟www.defens紺ews.com/story.php?F=2672284&C朝siapac) ; Government Forms Panel with Eye on Easing Ban on Collective
Self-Defense, Kyodo News, April 26, 2007
30) M如on no的i (Defense of Japan), Heisei 17Nen B虎ihakusho (2005Defense White Paper), Boeichohen, 2005
31) GSDF to Create Central Intelligence Unit to Boost Info-Gathering for International Missions, The Yomiuri Shinbun, December 31,
2006
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for a pro-active and more detailed version of OPLAN 5055 to improve the response of the
US-Japan Alliance in case of crisis or war in the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan
Strait32', the new Basic Maritime Law and Law on Establishing Safety Areas for Maritime
Structures to response to contingencies and to protect the national interests in Japan's
EEZ33), regular statements and bilateral talks with China to move toward more stable and
friendly relations34 -351, firm involvement in numerous bilateral or multilateral discussions
with Asian countries to develop a new Asian order -the East Asian Community- expected by
Tokyo to be centered on Japan36', and so on.
Two other decisive moves were made in late 2006 and early 2007. On December 15,
2006, Japan and India agreed on a further deepening of their Global Partnership toward a
Strategic Partnership promoting an Asian Economic Community as an Arc of Advantage
and Prosperity, to work bilaterally for the reform of the UNO to admit Japan and India as
new permanent members of the UN Security Council and support their mutual
candidature37', and to deal with the challenges of regional and global security by enhancing
bilateral security dialogues, military-t0-military talks, and service-to-service exchanges,
and various other security affairs38'. The second crucial recent move was made with
Australia. In 1957, Kishi Nobusuke signed the Japan-Australia Trade Agreement, and
nowadays Japan is the first trading partner of Australia. Fifty years later, Abe, grandson of
Kishi, has expanded the Japan-Australia relations toward a security partnership when the
Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was finalized at Tokyo, March
13, 200739). The agreement defines nine categories of joint activities: law enforcement, bor-
32) Japan, US Upgrading Military Emergency Plan, The Asahi Shinbun, January 5, 2007
33) Diet Passes Bills toprotectJapan EEZ, The Asahi Shinbun, April 21, 2007
34) Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, What's up Around the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Visists China, October 8, 2006
( http ://www. kantei.goj p/foreign/abephoto/2006/ 10/08china_e. html )
35) ibid, Startup Meeting for Japan-China High-Level Economic Dialogue, Reception to Welcome Premier Wen Jiabao 's Visit to Japan,
Apri1 12, 2007 (http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abephoto/2007/04./12china_e.html)
36) ibid, The First day of the ASEAN+3, Japan-ASEANand EastAsia Summit (EAS) SummitMeetings, January 14, 2007
(http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign./abephoto!2007,/01/14asean_e.html) ; ibid, Prime Minister Visits Vietnam, November 19-20, 2006
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der security, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation of WMD40), peace operations,
exchange of strategic assessments and related information, maritime and aviation security
counter-piracy) , relief operations, and contingency planning (including pandemics) 411. In
this regard, Japan and Australia will conduct exchanges of personnel, as well join training,
exercises and operations. The joint training would probably happen in the wide areas and
bases of Northern Australia42'.
However, these first successes should not be overestimated. First, the development of
these policies is still in its initial stage and we cannot know yet if Abe will fulfill his goals,
Second, some of his achievements are in fact continuations of policies initiated by previous
cabinets: for examples, the reorganization of the Self-Defense Forces, the realignment of
the US Forces m Japan, or the partnership with India. Third, Abe already counts some fail-
ures in security policy. Some of his statements destroy the efforts of his friendly diplomacy
with the other Asian countries, especially with China and South Korea, like when he denied
that the former Japanese imperial army and navy forced foreign women to sexual slavery
during the Great EAstern Asian War43'. Moreover, the Six-Party Talks on North-Korean
issues, as well the role of Japan in these negotiations, are rather sterile for the moment.
Fourth, Abe seems to reproduce in soft versions some of the pre-1945 most fundamental
strategic quests and are not from his originality '. Japan as a responsible major power
resembles to the Fukoku, KyoheiU} (Rich Nation, Strong Army) motto of the Meiji Era;
the equalized and strengthened US-Japan Alliance seems to be the improved pattern of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923); and the East Asian Community or Arc of
Advantage and Prosperity led by Japan appears as an ambiguous revival under a new for-
initiation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that Japan has dreamed sof ince the
Meiji Era and that was short-lived in 1940-45.
The principles of Abe s security policy remember some of the guidelines recommended
by his ancestor Yoshida Shigeru into the memorandum of April 27, 1928, just before his
appointment as vice-foreign minister of the Tanaka Cabinet (1927-1929) : Japan could not
survive without an empire from which to extract raw materials and control large markets, a
legal framework of overseas expansion and paHicularly positive treaties with China, mili-
40) Weapons of Mass Destruction
41) Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-Japan Joint Declar肋n on Security Cooperation, March
13, 2007 ( http ://www.dfat. gov. au/geo/j apan/ausJ ap_security_dec.html )
42) The Australian Defence, Pact Lets Diggers Train with Japanese, March 14, 2007
( http ://theaustral ian.news. com. au/story./0,20867, 2 1 378290-3 1477,00.html?什om=即blic_rss)
43) Abe Rejects Japan Files on War Sex, The New York Times, March 2, 2007
44) That concept aimed the rising of Japan as an autonomous major power.
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tary deterrence or actions to protect the special rights and the national interests of Japan,
and cooperative imperialism for the politico-military interventions and constabulary in Asia
(at that time, at the South of China's Great Wall) jointly with the Anglo-Saxon powers or
after consultation with them451. These pre-war recommendations of Yoshida reflect the very
classical Meiji ideas for the Grand Strategy of Japan, and Abe s vision seems largely
enlightened by that political tradition. Abe hold that kind of imperial consciousness, as it
was said of Yoshida too, but not necessarily the same skills. The future will tell us.
Relevance of Abe s Security Policy
To conclude this survey, a pragmatic question has still to be asked. Is Abe's vision,
which is in fact extremely representative of a majority within thd conservative ruling circle,
a relevant plan for the future of Japan?
The current reorganization of the Self-Defense Forces and even a constitutional revision
in the future would maybe not be enough to build up a power capable of defending the
national interests. The constitutional revision concerns the recognition of a military status
for the Self-Defense Forces and a normal use of force. It would probably not signify the
rising of Japan as a military power. Military normalization and military power must not be
confused as concepts. The objective of the new Japan is a military normalization. But, one
of the instruments that Japan will need to protect its interests is a military power and a full-
spectrum National Defense to deal with the various threats. In spite of some difficulties,
Japan, with its giant economical, industrial, and demographic (even with the estimation for
a future decline of the population) resources, has the potential to forge this autonomous
National Defense. If South Korea plans to achieve such a self-reliance defense for the hori-
zon 2020 , Japan, with more potential power, can certainly do it too. However, the option
of military power is rejected by the Japanese rulers and citizens in their immense majority.
As a result of this principle, not only the new Japan would not have the capacities required
for its policy of responsible power and would remain a military dwarf but, moreover, to
compensate for its lack of conventional military power, it could increasingly be seduced by
the nuclear power, especially if it is surrounded by other nuclear powers. Already, this dan-
45) DOWER John, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japane∫e Experience 1878- 1954, Harvard University Press, 1988, p.78-
83
46) FINNEGAN Michael, KIM Jiyul, The Republic of Korea Approaches the Future, Joint Force Quarterly, Institute for National Strategic
Studies, USA, Spring 2002, p.33-40; MND, 2004-2005 Defe耶e White Paper, Seoul, 2005; BENNETT Brace, A Brief Analysis of the
Rep〃blic of Korea.'ゞ Defense Reform Plan, Prepared for the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, RAND Corporation, 2006
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gerous te甲ptation to get its own nuclear arsenal is germinating in Japan s ruling class, and
enters into the debate in spite of the nuclear taboo still丘rmly implanted in society.
Nowadays, Japan relies mainly on the USA for its security and, considering its poor
defense capacities, the alliance with the USA is vital and should be improved, as it is also
argued by the Japanese rulers. But, reliance on this alliance is dangerous for Japan, even if
it is equalized and strengthened, because there are no guarantees that the American sword
and shield would be there in case of attack against Japan s homeland or interests. There are
three uncertainties. First, the USA would probably considers their national interests in the
specific environment of that attack, and it would not necessarily be evaluated by the White
House s rulers of that time to be in the concrete American interests to intervene alongside
Japan. Second, if the USA decided to protect Japan, maybe the necessary military capaci-
ties would not be available on time if the USA were already involved in other theaters of
operations, as the difficulties to mobilize military resources for the operations in Iraq are
proving. Third, even if the USA did choose to join Japan and would have enough available
forces, considering the time of response necessary to prepare and project their troops and
equipment, particularly if the enemy were to launch a surprise attack, there is a possibility
that Japan would already be defeated before any major American deployment on the theater
of operations. War is unpredictable, even by the best plans and simulations. It is a decisive
reason why Japan should not only review the Constitution but also develop an autonomous
military power, in respect of the regional military balance, and in addition to multiply its
l
allies. Abe desires to promote and strengthen military partnerships with India and
Australia, and maybe it could be later upgraded to military alliances when Japan would
give itself the full right to use the collective self-defense. However, the rising of this Japan-
USA-India-Austraha entente could easily disrupt the balance of power in Asia, especially
with the three major powers of Japan, the USA, and India combining their forces on one
side, and China alone or with Russia or some minor Asian powers on the other side. This
pattern remembering the situation in Europe at the eve of 1914 could destabilize Asia into
an escalation of crisis until it crashes into a generalized and total war. Japan should be
careful regarding the exact nature of its relations with the other major powers and in its
choices of strategic partners or allies.
Another major criticism concerning the relevance of this security policy is that the future
of Japan and Asia s security relies more on geopolitical parameters than on policies, prin-
ciples, and statements. Japan must take various measures for its diplomatic, defense, eco-
nomical, and other outcomes, to deal with the challenges and threats to its security and
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prosperity. But, there are limits to what can be peacefully resolved by such measures,
because the natural rule of geopolitics is pitiless and inexorable, and mightier than any
good will, laws, or mechanisms of international institutions. We are in a world where the
most fundamental actors of international relations, the states, are strategically defined by
their geopolitical environment. Permanent factors generally related to the geography domi-
nate the geopolitical order, and impose space, terrain, resources, and various other limits to
each state governing their people living in a fluctuating territory. There are also non-perma-
nent but secondary factors such as ethnic, demographic, ideological, and technological
changes. In the strategic equations of all these factors, each state is condemned to roam in a
confined spectrum of situations, as in a cycle of destiny. War and peace occur when the
geopolitical cycle turns to the combined parameters that produce these issues. Inevitably,
China will struggle and wage war against Japan in some of the future situations. The same
fatality is true for Japan too. By consequence, there is no certitude of peace, even when
some rulers decide that a peaceful policy is in the national interest. No situation is eternal,
neither the state of war nor the state of peace. Japan should sincerely promote a friendly
relationship with China and the other powers as long as it is possible, but should also optト
mally prepare itself for any other situations than peace, even the most extreme ones. It is
the duty of the state. Unfortunately, the strategic calculations made by Japan for its security
policy seem to be too much based on ideology and not enough on geopolitics.
Finally, a last problem remains: will Japan have enough political maturity to develop and
use wisely and efficiently the power planned by its rulers?
At the conclusion of this survey, the future National Defense of Japan, behind its mask of
illusory strength, risks appearing as a paper tiger.
